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Watch Your Mouth:
Reconciling Free Speech Rights of Coaches at Public Universities after Garcetti v. Ceballos
Ron Morgan
Courts have long recognized that the First Amendment Guarantee of free speech may not
protect individuals in their capacities as public employees in the same manner that it protects
them in their capacity as citizens.1 Early in our nation’s history, Justice Holmes stated that one
“may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a
policeman.”2 Over time, the Supreme Court has moved away from this line of thought by
expanding the rights of public employees and acknowledging that citizens are not deprived of
their constitutional rights by “virtue of working for the government.”3 Nevertheless, employees
are not guaranteed blanket free speech protection and current trends seem to indicate that their
limited free speech rights are continuing to wither.4 In the 2006 Garcetti v. Ceballos decision,
the Supreme Court held that public employees may be punished for engaging in otherwise
protected speech if that speech is made pursuant to their official duties.5
Unsurprisingly, Garcetti left many issues open for debate, including whether its holding
would be applicable in educational settings.6 Although there is no clear Supreme Court mandate,
a decision rendered by the Fourth Circuit earlier this year indicates that an academic caveat to the
Garcetti holding exists in regard to public university professors.7 Assuming the Fourth Circuit is
correct and these individuals are guaranteed some sort of constitutional protection, the question
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See McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220 (1892).
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3
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
4
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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Id.
6
Id. at 425.
7
Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011).
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then arises as to how far this exception reaches. This comment argues that the educator’s
exception to Garcetti should extend to athletic coaches at public universities.
University coaches, like professors, play a major role in the lives of their student athletes by
sharing their extensive knowledge about the sport and its relationship to other aspects of life.8
University coaches are entrusted with the significant tasks of pursuing championships, molding
the talent of some of the nation’s most gifted individuals, and imparting upon them lessons in
sportsmanship, teamwork, and leadership.9 Those who have given their professional lives to
train young athletes are aware of their responsibilities and refuse to take them lightly.10 When
interviewed about the great Florida State Head Football Coach Bobby Bowden, University of
Alabama coach Nick Saben did not harp on Bowden’s .756 overall winning percentage or two
national titles.11 Instead, he focused on Bowden’s class and love for the people he coached, and
further noted, “[a]s [a] coach, you wish maybe someday to be thought of as well as he is, not
only in terms of what he accomplished, but the way he did it."12
Given the significant role that coaches play in the lives of their student athletes, they should
be afforded the same academic free speech protection granted to professors that the Supreme
Court suggested in Garcetti and the Fourth Circuit announced in Adams. Applying Garcetti to
these individuals will not only be detrimental to the institutions that benefit from their victories,
but also to the students who benefit from their wisdom and experiences. This comment
illustrates the importance of protecting the free speech rights of university coaches by engaging

See Andrew Sharp, Coach enjoys players’ growth alongside that of his program, HESTON COLLEGE (May 11,
2011), https://mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&shva=1#inbox.
9
Id.
10
Football Legend Bobby Bowden LIVE with Bob Baumhower! PAGE & PALLETTE INC., http://www
.pageandpalette.com/event/bobby-bowden (last visited Sept. 19, 2011).
11
See generally Id.; Player Bio: Bobby Bowden, SEMINOLES.COM, http://www.seminoles.com/sports/mfootbl/mtt/bowden_bobby01.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
12
Football Legend, supra note 10.
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in a thorough analysis of the evolution of the public employee free speech doctrine and the
importance of academic freedom.
Part II of this comment analyzes the free speech rights enjoyed by public employees,
including coaches, before the Garcetti decision. Part III discusses the Garcetti case in detail and
attempts to reconcile it with the concept of academic freedom. Part IV of this comment asserts
academic freedom should extend beyond professors to coaches at public universities because
they play a pivotal role in molding the lives of some of the most gifted young people in our
country. Finally, this comment concludes in Part V,
Part II: Coaches Enjoyed Relatively Significant Free Speech Protection Under the Original
Pickering/Connick Analysis.
A. Pickering/Connick Background
Until the late 1950s the employee speech doctrine remained largely unchallenged and the law
generally abided by Justice Holmes’ early formulation.13 However, as the Twentieth Century
progressed, the Supreme Court began expanding its jurisprudence and granted public employees
more protection.14 While acknowledging certain employee free speech rights, the holdings of
Pickering v. Board. of Education and Connick v. Meyers appreciate that employers have
substantial interests in promoting efficiency in the work place.15 Therefore, employee protection
is limited and was initially satisfied only if the claimant satisfies a three-prong test.16 The three
prong test required an employee to prove that the speech in question (1) addressed a matter of
public concern, (2) that the employee’s right to speech outweighed the employer’s interest in
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Connick 461 U.S at 153.
Id.; Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will County, Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 571-72, (1968).
15
Connick 461 U.S. at 138; Pickering 391 US at 568.
16
TIMOTHY GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS (2d ed. 2011) at 374.
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promoting work place efficiency, and (3) that the speech in question was the primary reason for
retaliation.17
Apart from providing lower courts with these three guidelines, the Supreme Court has not yet
articulated precisely what is a matter of public concern.18 It is sufficient to realize that “mere
personal concerns or interests as opposed to those of the employee as a citizen are not matters of
public concern.”19 Thus, statements regarding an assassination attempt on a president20 or
proposed tax increases21 qualify as matters of public concern, but those involving purely inoffice procedures22 do not.
B. Coaches Rights Under a Pickering/Connick Analysis
Even before Garcetti, public university coaches, like all other public employees, did not
enjoy unlimited free speech regarding their employment. Therefore, if they were retaliated
against for an expression of speech, they would have to satisfy the three prongs of the
Pickering/Connick analysis.23 Given the amount of attention collegiate athletic programs receive
on a national scale, it appears that a coach’s speech related to the university, the athletic
program, or a school’s teams and players would satisfy the public concern prong of the
Pickering/Connick test.24 For example, in Hall v. Ford, Hall was fired from his position as
Athletic Director of the University of the District of Columbia for speaking out against the
alleged improprieties of the university’s athletic department.25 The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld his termination under a narrow policy-maker
17

Id. See Connick 461 U.S. at 138; Pickering 391 US at 568.
GLYNN, supra note 16 at 374-75.
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Id.
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Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987).
21
Pickering 391 US at 474.
22
Connick 461 U.S. at 154.
23
See Glynn, supra note 16 at 375.
24
See Hall v. Ford, 856 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
25
Id at 256.
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exception to the public employee free speech doctrine, but noted that Hall addressed a matter of
public concern when he made negative comments about ineligible players, the changing of
student grades, and the conducting of unauthorized practices.26 The court held that such sportsrelated expressions are sufficiently public because “ [a] substantial segment of the general public
would be interested in violations of athletic rules, which would reveal whether the current
university administration is mismanaging the athletic program.”27
Assuming that the DC Circuit is correct and a coach’s speech regarding the state of his
athletic program at a university satisfies the first part of the Pickering/Connick analysis, it would
follow that a coach’s right to speech about topics such as violation of league rules or policies of
the University that would hinder the progress of the program would outweigh the interests of the
institution.28 In Hall, the Court dismissed the petitioner’s claim under the governmental interest
prong of the test only because an Athletic Director qualifies as a “policymaker” and the
University has a great interest in maintaining loyalty of individuals at such a high capacity.29
Because a university coach is not as policy-oriented as an athletic director, his right to speech
and interest in controlling his team would probably outweigh the institution’s interests in a Halltype analysis.30 Given the probable satisfaction of the first two prongs of the test, and the
assumption that a coach could establish a sufficient nexus between the questioned expression and
a retaliatory action, it would appear as if university coaches were granted significant protection
under Pickering and Connick prior to Garcetti.

26

Id. at 257 (citing Rankin 483 U.S. at 390(1987)) (Public employers are accorded more deference to fire
policymaking employees for engaging in otherwise protected speech because the employer has a sufficiently great
interest in maintaining order in the workplace).
27
Id. at 259.
28
Id. at 261.
29
Id. at 265.
30
Id.

Although a coach’s speech would satisfy Pickering and Connick under most circumstances, it
is useful to distinguish speech that may receive such protection from speech that almost certainly
would not.

For instance, a coach who speaks about one of his players, while making prejudicial

or racial slurs, would probably not be protected by the First Amendment. In situations such as
that, courts have made it clear that only speech that sufficiently touches upon matters of public
concern receives protection.31 Thus, when speech is aimed solely at exploiting the employer,32
or it is simply “vulgar and indecent.,”33 the speaker has no right to utter it and to keep his job. In
the case of racial slurs about a coach’s players, the speech does not contribute to the sorts of
public issues the courts wish to protect. Therefore, such a coach would probably not be able to
make a successful argument of retaliatory termination if he asserted a First Amendment claim,
even though he is technically speaking on matters related to the team and the athletic program.
On the other hand, other sorts of speech would be granted Pickering/Connick protection. If a
coach spoke out against a blatant violation of NCAA rules, refused to play a less talented relative
of a school official, or spoke against bars upon practice techniques that the coach believes instill
pivotal values in his players, his speech would probably pass the totality-of-the-circumstances
test articulated by the Supreme Court.34 In these cases, the coach’s speech touches upon an issue
of public concern and his right to engage in it outweighs the university’s interest in preventing it
since the coach is not purposefully exploiting his employer.35 Therefore, before the
implementation of Garcetti, it seems relatively clear that coaches would have been granted a
substantial amount of deference regarding certain speech made about their respective programs.

31

City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004); Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 927 (9th Cir.
2008)
32
Roe 543 U.S. at 84
33
Dible 515 F.3d at 927
34
See Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will County, Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968)
35
See generally Hall 856 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

Even high-school coaches, who appear to enjoy much less protection than their collegiate
counterparts post-Garcetti, enjoyed at least some First Amendment protection under Pickering
and Connick.36 For instance, in Bowman v. Pulaski County, the Eighth Circuit found that the
involuntary transfer of assistant football coaches after they had spoken out against corporal
punishment was unconstitutional.37 In reaching its conclusion, the court held that the speech of
the assistant coaches addressed a matter of public concern because “the question of what
constitutes the proper care and education of children is one of the most frequently debated issues
in the public forum.”38 Additionally, the coaches’ interests outweighed those of the school
district since their pertinent expressions did not impede their ability to perform their tasks and
instruct the children. 39 Therefore, the court ordered the reinstatement of the coaches to their
former positions or jobs that would be equally desirable.40
Despite employee victories like the one in Bowman, courts were careful to not over-extend
the free speech rights of high school coaches.41 The Tenth Circuit exemplified this when it held
that the school district had not violated the rights of head football coach Ron Lancaster by firing
him for statements he made regarding his one-game suspension.42 The high school refused to
disclose the reason for the coach’s suspension.43 When the local newspaper asked Lancaster
why he thought he had been suspended, he said that “no one has given us an explanation” about
it.44 Lancaster asserted that this comment to the newspaper ultimately lead to his termination.45

36

Bowman v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 773 F.2d 640 (8th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 645.
38
Bowman, 773 F.2d at 643.
39
Id. at 644.
40
Id. at 645.
41
Lancaster v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 149 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 1998); Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042
(5th Cir. 1996); Brayton v. Monson Pub. Sch., 950 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1997).
42
Lancaster, 149 F.3d at 1233.
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Id. at 1232.
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According to the Tenth Circuit, Lancaster could not recover even if the speech in question lead
to his dismissal because it merely involved procedures that were internal to the high school and it
did not qualify as a matter of public concern.46 Unfortunately for public school coaches, the
Bowman decision was indicative of the direction the Court would eventually turn to limit the
rights of public employees.47
Part III: Although the Garcetti Decision Severely Limited Employee Rights, It Does Not Apply
to the Academic World.
A. Background of Garcetti
The 2006 Supreme Court decision, Garcetti v. Ceballos further restricted the rights of public
employees and indicated a huge shift back to the Court’s original jurisprudence according very
high deference to employers.48 In Garcetti, Ceballos, a Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney
was fired for submitting a memorandum suggesting that the state dismiss a case due to
government misconduct.49 Ceballos became aware of the alleged misconduct after a defense
attorney contacted him regarding a potential flaw in search warrant executed against his client.50
Ceballos investigated the matter and discovered that the state utilized an affidavit laden with
misrepresentations to obtain the warrant.51 Ceballos spoke on the telephone to the warrant
affiant, a deputy sheriff from the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, but he did not
receive a satisfactory explanation for the perceived inaccuracies.52 He then relayed his findings
to his supervisors and followed up by preparing two separate disposition memoranda.53 The

46

Id.
See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
48
Id.; GLYNN, supra note 16 at 388.
49
Garcetti, 457 U.S. at 410.
50
Id. at 413-414.
51
Id. 414.
52
Id.
53
Id.
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memos articulated Ceballos’ concerns over the misrepresentations and his recommendation that
the state dismiss the case. 54
After taking a series of retaliatory actions against Ceballos for statements made in the
memoranda, the District Attorney eventually fired him.55 Ceballos promptly filed suit alleging a
breach of his First Amendment right to free speech.56 The District Attorney argued that the First
Amendment did not apply to the scenario at hand because it did not protect inter-office
memoranda.57 The Ninth Circuit agreed with Ceballos and the Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari. 58
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, holding that Ceballos was not protected.59 In
its decision, the Court noted that in each of the situations where it upheld a public employee’s
right to free speech, the individual was acting in his capacity as a citizen, not as an employee.60
The fact that Ceballos issued his memoranda as a Deputy District Attorney distinguished him
from that protected class of people.61 In the ruling against Ceballos, the Court held that “when
public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.”62 This recently articulated “official duties” prong
practically cripples the already limited protection public employees enjoyed under the
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Id.
Garcetti, 457 U.S. at 415.
56
Id.
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Id. at 415-16.
59
Id. at 425.
60
Id. at 420.
61
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
62
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Pickering/Connick analysis and allows employers to engage in retaliatory action that was
previously prohibited.63
Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that Garcetti may not apply to all types of public
employees and was careful to note that it may not apply to the academic setting.64 In his dissent,
Justice Souter argued that the Court’s decision could be detrimental because it would in effect
destroy the academic freedom accorded to those who educate the nation’s youth.65 However, the
majority addressed Justice Souter’s concern by explicitly stating that it “need not, and for that
reason do not, decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the same manner to
a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching.”66 In the absence of a clear mandate,
the fate of academic freedom remains uncertain. However, recent developments in the Fourth
Circuit indicate that academic freedom may not be subject to Garcetti, at least in regards to
university professors.67
B. The Principle of Academic Freedom is Crucial to the Development of Our Nation’s
Youth
As early as the beginning of the twentieth century, our nation realized that the concept of
academic freedom is essential to the functioning of a public university.68 In 1915, the American
Association of University Professors asserted this principle and articulated its elements, noting
that “[a]cademic freedom comprises freedom of inquiry and research; freedom of teaching within
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GLYNN, supra note 16 at 388.
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425..
65
Id. at 429 (Souter, J. Dissenting).
66
Id. at 425.
67
Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011)
68
Darryn Cathryn Beckstrom, Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine and Academic Speech After
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1202, 1218 (2010).
64

the university or college; and freedom of extramural utterance and action.”69 The Supreme Court
began to acknowledge this freedom in the 1920s with its decisions in Meyer v. Nebraska and
Bartels v. Iowa by holding that statutes banning the teaching of foreign languages were
unconstitutional.70 Since those seminal cases, the law regarding academic freedom has been
expanded in some regards71 and restricted in others.72
Although it is not readily apparent at all stages of education, academic freedom seems most
robust in the public university setting.73 In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court
addressed the necessity of academic freedom in universities because “[t]o impose any strait
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of
our Nation.”74 The Court elaborated on this position in Grutter v. Bollinger, by explaining that it
has “long recognized that, given the important purpose of public education and the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated with the university environment, universities occupy
a special niche in our constitutional tradition.”75 The unique importance of the university
environment is pivotal to the analysis, since the Court expressly noted in Parents Involved v.
Seattle Sch. Dist. that secondary schools are not entitled to assert some of the same sorts of
interests that universities are entitled to claim.76 These precedents demonstrate that it is highly
unlikely that the Supreme Court desired for Garcetti to practically destroy the free speech
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Id. (citing Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 1915 Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Academic
Tenure 292 (1915), available at http:// www.aaup.org/NR/rdonl yres/A6520A9D-0A9A-47B3B550C006B5B224E7/0/1915Declaration.pdf.).
70
Alison E. Price, Understanding the Free Speech Rights of Public School Coaches, 18 SETON HALL J. SPORTS &
ENT. L. 209, 219 (2008) (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404 (1923).
71
See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (discussing the importance of academic freedom in a
University setting.).
72
See Evans-Marshall v. Bd of Educ, of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010).
73
Beckstrom, supra note 68 at 1219; Sweezy 354 U.S. at 250.
74
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
75
Breckstorm, supra note 68 at 1220 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003)).
76
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 725 (2007).

protection that courts have recognized for over a half-century.77 Rather, the Court’s reluctance to
issue a clear directive on the issue of academic speech pursuant to official duties merely
demonstrates that the issue was not ripe to be definitively resolved.
At least one circuit has interpreted the Court’s failure to explicitly deny an academic caveat
to Garcetti as evidence of the Court’s support for such an exemption.78 In Adams v. Trustees of
the University of North Carolina-Wilmington, the Fourth Circuit held that the university violated
the constitutional right of Associate Professor Michael S. Adams by failing to promote him after
he had engaged in unfavorable speech.79 Adams, a criminology professor, alleged that the
University did not promote him because of his speeches, articles, and books related to his
outspoken Christian/conservative views.80 In the initial ruling, the district court relied on
Garcetti, holding that the speeches, articles and books were sufficiently related to Adams’
professional capacity as a professor and not to his capacity as a private citizen.81 The district
court noted that Adams had listed these articles and speeches on his application for promotion,
and by doing so he conceded that they were aspects of his professional duties.82
The Fourth Circuit reversed, acknowledging that, although employers have a heightened
interest in controlling the speech of their employees, that principle was inapplicable here.83
Because Adams’ speech was clearly protected by the First Amendment at the time of
presentment, it cannot lose its protected status after Adams referenced it in his application.84
Furthermore, the Circuit Court focused on the plain language in Garcetti, which indicated that
77

See Id.; Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
Adams v. Trustees of the University of North Carolina-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550 (4th Cir. 2011)
79
Id. at 565.
80
Id. at 554.
81
Id. at 561.
82
Id,
83
Id. at 562.
84
Adams, 640 F.3d at 562
78

professors and other academics may be entitled to more First Amendment protection than other
categories of employees.85 A professor’s speech may be subject to limitations regarding
administrative or clerical duties, but it is protected when discussing academic issues related to
public concern.86
Apart from voicing its support for the academic caveat to Garcetti, the Fourth Circuit also
circumvented the issue slightly by indicating that Adams’ speech may not have been part of his
official duties.87 In his majority opinion Judge Agee stated, "Adams's speech was not tied to any
more specific or direct employee duty than the general concept that professors will engage in
writing, public appearances, and service within their respective fields."88 These “general
concepts” are related to individuals’ capacities as private citizens, and are subject to First
Amendment protection.”89
Scholarly commentary regarding Adams indicated a strong belief that the case was destined
for the Supreme Court.90 However, several months after the decision, the parties did not present
the Court with a petition for certiorari.91 It is quite likely that the Fourth Circuit’s alternate
holding, stating that Adams was not speaking in his capacity as a professor, and thus Garcetti is
inapplicable, deemed the issue unworthy of the Court’s consideration. The Court could have
simply relied on this reasoning, affirmed the Fourth Circuit, and declined to issue a ruling on the
broader implications of Garcetti. But, given the role that professors play in modern society, it
would appear as though any scholarly speech could be tied to a professor’s professional duties,
85

Id. at 563.
Id. at 564.
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Id.
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Id.
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Paul Secunda, 4th Cir: Garcetti Does Not Apply in Higher Education Setting, WORKPLACE PROF. BLOG (Apr. 7.
2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2011/04/4th-cir-garcetti-does-not-apply-in-highereducation-setting.html.
91
Adams, 640 F.3d 550.
86

and the parties of Adams should have petitioned the Court to utilize this opportunity to issue a
mandate regarding academic speech in the public university setting.92 Nevertheless, this
comment is not aimed at predicting the Court’s treatment of Adams or similar cases. Therefore,
the rest of the argument will adopt the position alluded to in Garcetti and articulated by the
Fourth Circuit that professors enjoy more First Amendment free speech rights than other types of
public employees due to the unique importance of universities in the lives of the nation’s youth.93
Despite the possible protection allotted to those who work in academics at a public
university, recent rulings in the Sixth94 and Third95 circuits indicate that any free speech rights in
regards to expressions made during the performance of official academic duties do not extend to
lower institutions. In Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Ed., the Sixth Circuit held that Garcetti applies to
the in-class curricular speech of high school teachers.96 The plaintiff, Evans-Marshall, was fired
from her position as a high school English teacher for assigning controversial books as
mandatory reading.97 Parents of students were outraged and demanded the school district release
Evans-Marshall after discovering that she assigned literature such as Herman Hesse's
Siddhartha, Ray Bradbury’s Fahrenheit 451, and Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird, and
showed a movie adaptation of Romeo and Juliet, which is rated PG-13.98 Despite claims that she
was entitled to constitutional protection, the Sixth Circuit ruled in accordance with Garcetti,
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Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010).
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Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2008)
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holding that the speech in question was made pursuant to official duties, and Evans-Marshall was
not entitled to constitutional protection.99
Similar to Garcetti, the Evans-Marshall court found the application of Pickering/Connick
balancing to be irrelevant because Evans-Marshall was engaging in speech pursuant to her
official duties as a public school teacher.100 For this reason, Professor Paul Secunda asserts that
the Evans-Marshall decision is “absurd.”101 Although he recognizes that children in secondary
schools are highly impressionable and there must be some sort of discretion used in determining
a curriculum, Professor Secunda holds that the court is wrong to deny teachers in these
institutions all of their First Amendment free speech protection.102 In the absence of meaningful
Pickering/Connick balancing, Secunda believes that the Evans-Marshall decision is unduly
drastic and is a terrible loss for teachers around the country.103
Professor Secunda’s unfavorable view of the Evans-Marshall decision may be correct, but it
is not impossible to reconcile it with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Adams. When reading the
two cases together, those who work in the university setting are granted more protection than
those at lower-level institutions.104 This principle is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
repeated willingness to give more deference to those asserting constitutional rights in a
university setting than to similar claims arising under different circumstances.105
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Id. at 344.
Id. at 340.
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Paul Secunda, Garcetti v. Pubic School Teachers: Garcetti Wins and We All Lose, Workplace Prof. Blog (Oct.
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See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
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The Third Circuit’s ruling in Borden v. Sch. District gives further credence to the notion that
primary and secondary school employees do not enjoy much First Amendment protection by
adopting standards similar to those announced in Evans-Marshall.106 There, the Court rejected
high school football coach Borden’s First Amendment claim by holding that the school district
did not violate his rights by firing him for saying prayers before games and bowing his head to
show respect to his peers.107 Although the Court did not analyze the case specifically under
Garcetti, it mentioned that Coach Borden’s claim would be precluded if the “official duties”
limitation applied under these circumstances.108
The Third Circuit did not address the claim under the Garcetti guidelines due to the
Supreme Court’s refusal to issue a mandate about the possible academic caveat.109 However,
reaching its ruling against the coach, it made note “that a teacher’s in-class conduct is not
protected speech.”110 Furthermore, in a footnote, the court outlined how it would have ruled if it
were appropriate to apply a Garcetti analysis.111 It stated that, even if Garcetti did not apply to
the educational setting, Borden would not be entitled to any sort of protection since his
expressions did not address an issue of public concern since they only related to his interactions
with his players.112 The Court went on to argue that if the expressions were classified as an
issue of public concern, and Garcetti does apply to the educational setting, it would still preclude
recovery because Coach Borden was engaging in his official duties of leading his team as a
coach and not as a private citizen.113
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Borden v. Sch. Dist. of Twp. of E. Brunswick, 523 F.3d 153, 168-9 (3d Cir. 2008)
Id. at 184-85.
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Despite purporting to acknowledge the possibility of an “academic freedom” exemption to
the “official duties” analysis, the Third Circuit is clearly unsympathetic to the free speech rights
of those employed as coaches and teachers at secondary schools.114 In her comment arguing that
the Third Circuit should apply a more deferential analysis in cases like Borden, Allison Price
argues that coaches should be granted greater First Amendment protection than other public
employees.115 Ms. Price acknowledges that “applying Garcetti to a coach’s instructional speech
is dangerous” because communications with and about his athletes are part of a coach’s official
duties.116 Thus, coaches would hardly ever be eligible for free speech protection despite the
pivotal role they play in instilling values in the players on their team.117
Although notable, cases like Grutter and Parents Involved show that Ms. Price’s
observations may be inappropriate for an analysis of cases stemming from secondary schools.118
Apart from Borden, Evans-Marshall also demonstrates that the Circuits are reluctant to
recognize an academic caveat for employees at public high schools.119 Conversely, case law and
scholarly commentary acknowledge the unique importance given to the free flow of information
from instructor to pupil in a university setting, and suggest that Ms. Price’s general theory that
coaches should receive more Constitutional protection is more credible when applied to the
university setting.120
In her comment in the Minnesota Law Review, Reconciling the Public Employee Speech
Doctrine and Academic Speech After Garcetti v. Ceballos, Ms. Beckstrom, holds that the
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government has less of an interest in restricting the speech of academics than it does in
restricting the speech of other public employees.121 Unlike other public employees, universities
do not hire coaches and professors “to promote a specific government interest.”122 Public
universities do not generally exercise control over a professor’s curriculum or a coach’s methods
“the way a traditional public employer exercises control over its employees.123 In this regard, it
would seem that academics fall outside the articulated purpose of Garcetti to protect the
employer from the possibility that the employee’s speech is consistent with the government’s
positions. 124 Therefore, coaches and professors at public universities should not be subject to
the same limitations as other employees when speaking pursuant to their official duties on
matters of public concern.
C. Coaches are Not Subject to the “Captive Audience” Limitation of First Amendment
Free Speech.
Citizens are entitled to First Amendment free exercise of speech unless the expression
invades substantial privacy interests in an intolerable manner.125 Although it may be weak, this
sort of “captive audience” argument may be made to deny coaches their right to free speech
because to be on the team, players are subject to the thoughts of their coaches. In the university
setting, players are particularly subject to a coach’s views because many of them are attending
the institution on athletic scholarships.126 These students have less of an option to voice their
opinions against their coaches or to quit the team because doing so could result in them losing
their scholarships and perhaps an opportunity to receive a quality education. However, the
121
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Supreme Court has interpreted the “captive audience” restriction quite narrowly, and it would
seem that it would not be appropriate to apply to the athletic spectrum.127
In Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., the Court explained that the captive audience restriction
applies in scenarios where an individual is inescapably captive.128 There, the Court held that an
individual is entitled to the utmost amount of privacy in his own home and the state may allow
him to expressly ban unwanted mail.129 Although the Court recognized that sending mail as a
means of advertising is a dominant feature of our society that should not be destroyed, an
individual has a right to explicitly request that certain mail not enter his home. 130 The Court
likened such behavior to forcing an individual to permit trespassers into his home, or barring him
from changing a television station.131 It recognized that mail is subject to free speech
protections, but when explicitly unwanted mail intolerably invades the substantial privacy
interests of an individual, the state has a substantial interest in protecting a captive audience.
Thus, the court upheld the law permitting individuals to ban certain unwanted items of mail
against a First Amendment challenge.
Despite recognizing this limitation on free speech, the Court was careful to not extend it
unnecessarily.132 In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, the Court invalidated a state law banning
the showing of movies that contained nudity at a drive-in theater where such nudity was possibly
visible to passers-by.133 The Court realized that the unfortunate reality is that many things
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citizens encounter on a daily basis offend others’ political and moral sensibilities.134 But, “the
Constitution does not permit government to decide which types of otherwise protected speech
are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.135 Rather,
absent [narrow] circumstances…the burden normally falls upon the viewer to avoid further
bombardment of [his] sensibilities by averting [his] eyes.”136 The Court went on to note that an
individual may not engage in otherwise protected speech if it is calculated to offend the
sensibilities on an unwanted audience.”137 However, the drive-in theater did not aim at offending
the unwilling.138 Rather it would have preferred if the unwilling could not have seen the screen
since they did not pay for tickets.139 Therefore, the restriction on speech is inapplicable in this
case.140
The above examples indicate that it is unlikely that the captive audience exception to free
speech would be a problem for coaches.141 Athletes are not inescapably captive since they
choose to play a specific sport and in many situations choose a university based on the reputation
of its head coach.142 Unless proponents of the captive audience argument could prove that the
coach’s speech was “calculated to offend the sensibilities on an unwanted audience,” their
speech should be protected against this limitation.143 It is probable that this limitation does not
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typically apply to coaches since it is unlikely that they would aim to offend their players while
speaking pursuant to their official duties.144

Part IV: An Application of Relevant Case Law Indicates That Coaches at Public Universities
Should Not be Subject to the Garcetti Limitations.
A. Coaches Receive Protection When Speaking in Their Capacities as Private Citizens
Like professors, coaches may be viewed as symbols of the university while they are in
public.145 However, whatever Garcetti means for coaches, it clearly has no effect on their free
speech rights when they are not speaking as part of their official duties.146 Saint Louis
University (SLU) men's basketball coach Rick Majerus was in the spotlight for a brief period in
2008 for statements he made while attending a Hillary Clinton rally regarding his support for
pro-choice and stem cell research.147 SLU, a private Jesuit institution that has substantially more
power as an employer to terminate its employees than a public institution, did not retaliate
against the coach.148 In the interview, Majerus acknowledged he was not there as a
representative of the university, but nevertheless identified himself as the university’s basketball
coach.149 Among the chatter over the rights of a university employee, SLU took no formal
action, asserting "Coach Rick Majerus' comments were his own personal views, and he was not
speaking for Saint Louis University. The comments were made at a non-university event and he
was not there as a university representative.”150
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Although he does not work for a public employer, if Majerus did work for a public university
that took formal action against him for his statement, it appears that his statements would be
protected.151 By speaking about policies related to a presidential election, Majerus’ statements
clearly address an issue of public concern.152 Next, Majerus’ free speech interests probably
outweigh any employment-based interests that the university could articulate. A public
university may have some interest in keeping its employees from speaking out in political
matters. However, it is highly unlikely that Majerus’ views on stem cell research would
negatively impact his ability to effectively lead his team.153 Therefore, under a Pre-Garcetti
analysis, coaches at public institutions would have been clearly protected for making these sorts
of expressions.
Expressions like Coach Majerus’ also fall into the narrow category of speech protected
despite the holding of Garcetti. It would be difficult to make an argument that speech related to
a presidential campaign and stem cell research could be made pursuant to his official duties.
Additionally, Majerus explicitly stated that he was not acting or speaking as a representative of
the university.154 When the speech is not contingent on the individual’s capacity as an employee,
and it is made as a citizen on a matter of public concern, employees are generally entitled to First
Amendment Protection.155
B. Coaches are entitled to Free Speech Protection when speaking pursuant to their
official duties.
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Applying a Garcetti-type analysis to collegiate coaches is unnecessary and detrimental to
collegiate athletics and the students who participate in them. Presumably, individuals are hired
as coaches because they have demonstrated an expertise in their field and the university hopes to
gain from that expertise. As experts, it follows that coaches should be given freedom to control
their teams in the manner they choose within reason. By examining a set of hypothetical
examples, it becomes clear which areas of a coach’s speech deserve protection, which ones do
not, and reasons why the courts should ensure such protection remains.
The example of Coach Majerus involves a scenario so far removed from a coach’s official
duties that a Garcetti issue would hardly arise.156

However, different scenarios could involve

closer questions of when a coach’s speech invokes a Garcetti question. Consider a coach who
speaks out against a campus policy of adding more trees to the university quad. The coach’s
speech relates to a university policy, but it is in no way part of his duties to speak or concern
himself with the horticulture practices of the university. Therefore, this speech would not even
trigger a Garcetti analysis because the coach did not speak pursuant to his official duties.
Additionally, he may have no free speech protection in this scenario because commenting about
trees on the quad appears to be more of an internal complaint like the one at issue in Connick.157
Unless an individual is an alumnus or has a child in attendance at the university, it is highly
unlikely that the public would be concerned about the amount of trees on the quad. The speech
in question here deals solely with the internal policies of the institution and should be handled
privately among the school’s officials. Since it does not touch public concern, nor does it deal
with the coach’s official duties, this speech should be given no protection.158
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On the other hand, speech regarding the coach’s teaching style does enter the Garcetti
framework. For example, a basketball coach’s decision to run a high paced offense over a slow
paced one is his decision to make. As the university hired the coach for his expertise in
basketball, these are the types of decisions that he should be autonomous in making and should
not have to worry about being reprimanded because less qualified administrators disagree with
his judgment. However, it would seem as if this is the exact sort of speech that Garcetti would
prohibit. Under Hall, the speech regarding the offense would probably satisfy the public concern
prong since athletics receive a great deal of media coverage in the newspapers and on
television.159 Conversely, the coach here is speaking pursuant to his official duties, thus Garcetti
would permit the university to fire him if they do not like his approach to how he chooses to
conduct his offense.160
A coach’s only hope to protect this sort of speech is by asserting the proposed Adams
academic caveat.161 Admittedly, at first glance, offensive plays or defensive blocking schemes
do not seem to be what the Fourth Circuit imagined when it considered the possible academic
caveat. Nevertheless, coaches, like professors, should be entitled to the freedom to teach in a
particular way. Not only are coaches implementing methods they believe will benefit the
university with victories, but they are instilling values in their players that will last them a
lifetime.
In a recent interview, North Carolina head basketball coach Roy Williams alluded to the lifelessons he is imparting on the young athletes that play for him.162 Coach Williams spoke about
how his freshmen are growing as players by taking leadership on the court, and how he rewarded
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the hustle and determination of another player by adding him to the starting line-up and giving
him more playing time. 163 Qualities like determination, leadership, and proper work ethic are
lessons that these players will benefit from throughout their lives. Arguably, it is likely that the
students who play for a great coach like Coach Williams will utilize the lessons they learned
under his guidance more than those learned in certain lecture halls. Through this lens, coaches
must be free to pursue the type of offense, defense, and practice styles they believe to be the
most successful without the fear of outside interference.
Like the “trees on the quad” scenario, one may argue that the issues over managing team
dichotomy could perhaps fall under an inter-office dispute, barred by Connick.164 However,
unlike the number of trees the university chooses to plant, a coach’s methods of teaching usually
touch on public concern since often times millions of individuals follow these decisions and the
progress of their favorite team. Therefore, decisions reflecting a university coach’s area of
expertise that implement values upon his student-athletes should be free from official reprimand
and not subject to Garcetti restrictions.
One final scenario that I will explore is a coach’s speech in regards to refusing to comply
with policies implemented by the university that contradict NCAA policy. Here, a coach’s right
to speech should be most protected and not subject to Garcetti. For instance, if a university
implements a policy to give out illegal scholarships to certain individuals, or to contravene
NCAA guidelines by providing its players with monetary rewards, a coach should not need to
worry about losing his job for disagreeing with the flawed policies. Even at the high school
level, courts have acknowledged that coaches speaking out against illicit practices by the
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institution are entitled to First Amendment protection.165 Therefore, when engaging in this sort
of speech, Garcetti should not even enter the realm of discussion and courts should be interested
in promoting the compliance of positive regulations.
Part V: Conclusion
If coaches are not accorded these freedoms, it would be disastrous to our student athletes,
who would be robbed of the opportunity to benefit from the knowledge of some of the brightest
and most successful individuals in the university community. This comment does not attempt to
make the argument that coaches should be insulated from being fired at all times. When a coach
does not perform to expectations, or he does not provide for satisfactory records or recruitments
year after year, he should be fired for his inadequacies. This article additionally does not allege
that all coaches and all speech should be guaranteed to the limited protection articulated in
Pickering and Connick. However, when a college coach is speaking on matters of public
concern related to his official duties of managing his team or about policies relating to the sports
program, he should be afforded the protection Adams suggests that university professors
enjoy.166
Applying a Garcetti analysis to the academic realm is beyond the purpose the Supreme Court
envisioned for its holding.167 Unlike other types of public employees, professors and coaches are
not hired to promote government ideas.168 They are hired to convey their views and impart the
nation’s youth with knowledge they have acquired over several years of intense studying and
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preparation, with the hopes of eventually leaving their impact on the lives of those who were
fortunate enough to benefit from their instruction169
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